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PANEL DISCUSSION I
Justice Scott Brister,Justice Nathan L. Hecht, William V.
Dorsaneo,III, Mike Hatchell
Moderator: Justice Patrick Higginbotham
Former ChiefJustice Thomas Phillips:
We have just heard a rather diverse group of addresses, looking
at judges and juries from different perspectives. Here to lead the
speakers in exploring each other's topics, we are privileged to have
Judge Patrick Higginbotham of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit.
Judge Higginbotham is a graduate of the University of Alabama
and its law school. After graduation, he spent three years in the JAG
Corps and then came to Dallas, Texas, where he practiced law with
great distinction for eleven years before Gerald Ford appointed him
to the federal district bench in 1975. Seven years later, President
Reagan elevated him to the Fifth Circuit, where he remains today
after twenty-three years. I wish Justice Priscilla Owen were here to
hear this: he was confirmed by the Senate just ten days after his
nomination to the district court and just twenty-six days after his
appointment to the circuit court. He has won just about every honor
that can be graced upon a lawyer or judge, and served on numerous
committees and commissions to improve the law and the courts.
Judge, this is a pretty unruly group; I don't know how you're
going to moderate them.
Judge PatrickHigginbotham:
Well, I don't know how I'm going to do this either. It is kind of
hard to ride one thoroughbred and you get a whole covey of 'em here.
I guess you can have a covey of thoroughbreds, can't you? We are
gong to have a fun problem. It's a fun problem because they all have
ideas about this topic.
What we are going to talk about is a great current topic and one

SOUTH TEXAS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47:367

which you students will be living with in your career. The reality is
that you're going to be looking at a court system, certainly on a
federal level, and I think predictably so, with the state level, that is
quite different than the courts, especially the trial courts, were during
the years that I was trying lawsuits, the years I was on the trial bench,
in fact my whole career. It is changing. But it's been changing for
some time and what I want to do is take a couple of minutes and just
introduce the changing picture, give you a little data and then I want
to bring this panel in, and we will talk about this phenomena.
Everybody has judgments, speculations, and inferences about what is
going on and what are their implications for the future.
In a nutshell, for the past thirty plus years, there has been a
marked decline in the trial of cases. Sometimes that is formulated as a
demise of jury trials. I first noticed this somewhat by happenstance a
few years ago in looking at some data that was put forward as
justification for the creation of two new district courts in the federal
system. It was my task in the bureaucracy of the courts to sign my
name to that and send it on, but I didn't. The judge that sent it up to
me at the district court didn't tell me much about what was going on
and so rather than go back and ask him for some data, I called the
clerk and said, "Give me some more stuff, I want to prove this, but I
need some more material behind it." And then when I started looking
behind it, it wasn't there. I began to pull this string on this thread and
the sweater fell off. And then I took the opportunity to put this out
there and then I published it in a formal lecture.' Now the academy
has gratefully picked up on this and there is a raging storm. People
have realized something that has been going on for some period of
time. Someone likened it to having a beautiful home only to discover
that it is riddled with termites; suddenly, it is an empty shell.
I entitled a lecture I gave several years ago as: Why Do We Still
Call Them Trial Courts?2 Let me give you some quick data to put this
question in perspective. Starting thirty years ago, in every category of
case in the United States district court and in every category of case in
which the Administrative Office of the United States Courts keeps
data, there has been a decline. You chart this and it started in the
upper left-hand corner and it moved in all those categories. All those
lines moved together down toward the lower right corner of the
graph. Civil and criminal. Now, I said, "Well, gee." I looked at this
1. Patrick E. Higginbotham, The Changing Times of the U.S. District Courts,
Address at the 78th American Law Institute Annual Meeting (May 15, 2001).
2. Patrick E. Higginbotham, Why Do We Still Call Them Trial Courts?, 55 SMU L.
REV. 1405 (2002).
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stuff and I can kind of surmise that maybe what's going on here with
the criminal side had to do with when the sentencing guidelines came
in. It gave it a lot of power to the district attorney and pushed the
guilty pleas up to ninety-nine plus percent, in criminal cases. But, civil
jury trial cases are also going away. The last couple of years, the
average United States district court judge tried thirteen cases of an
average length of two days. In other words, twenty-six trial days out of
the entire year. That's average, which means there are some districts
that are trying more, but there are some trying less.
And you say, "What's going on? What's happening to this
system?" We are going to explore this and work with Dr. Deborah
Hensler, who was formerly the head of the Institute of Justice Studies
at RAND and is now professor of law at Stanford. She not only has a
law degree, although she's a professor of law now, but she has a
doctorate in economics and social science from MIT. She is a brilliant
woman who has done a great deal of empirical work over this data,
and she began to raise questions about the state system as well. Others
have explored it, and we are finding, although it's preliminary, that
there are significant parallel movements. So it is a given that that is
happened. That's no longer disputed. Now, the question is: why is this
going on? It has been going on steadily for thirty years. You can put it
beside the exponential growth of arbitrations. If you go back and take
a snapshot five years ago and if you ask the question: "What do the
arbitration numbers look like?" What you'd find is that moved over
the preceding ten years from roughly 40,000 to 60,000 or 70,000, then
to 100,000, and now well over 140,000. I don't remember the precise
numbers, but a huge exponential jump in arbitrations. Quite plainly, it
is moving in the opposite direction from public litigation.
Quite plainly, the people are dialing out of the trial courts. Some
of this is accounted for in the growth in mediation, ADR, et cetera.
Now, ADR and private litigation are not the culprits. They are the
beneficiaries of what's going on. They are not the cause. I raise this
question with you. In the federal side, what we have seen is a
disconnect between trials and pretrial. The moving point in federal
litigation now in the civil side is summary judgment. It is not trial.
There's little expectation a case will be tried. Increasingly, as this
happens over time, we start to ask the question: "Well, what does this
mean?" What happens when you have trial judges and then the trial
bar increasingly in a culture where there's not an expectation of trial.
What are the consequences? Let me just go to the panel and I'd like
to hear each one of the panel offer their judgment about what they
think is the single most important factor for this change.
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Now, in many discussions, we have talked about this very
practical picture. One thing we know in sources put before us is that
dispute resolution in this country for the past 200 years has been
publicly owned. It belongs to the people. It belongs to the
government. The courthouse belongs to the government. The people
who staff it, the judges, the prosecutors, and the court reporters all are
employees of the state. The lawyers there are licensed by the State. It
is a public facility. The doors-except in rare circumstances-are
open. You can go in and you can see. It is a system that has a
democratic component to it and people participate in the form of jury
participation. Now, that's the picture. Public litigation launched by
government. What this picture suggests is that we're moving to private
litigation, where disputes between major players can be resolved
privately with no disclosure. We have large fights in the federal rules
of whether a federal judge can enter a sealing order to resolve
litigation that's being settled so that the public will not know what's
been generated. Well, that's very interesting, except that now with a
lot of this litigation, with a lot of critical information involving major
publicly-held companies, is being held and being tried by neutrals in a
private forum. Is that a good thing? Is that a bad thing? Let us talk
first about why.
QUESTION AND ANSWER SESSION

Judge PatrickHigginbotham:

Let me just start down with Justice Nathan Hecht. Nathan, let's
start off with this question: What's the single most important
contribution? What do you think is causing this?
Justice Nathan Hecht:

As I said a little earlier, the numbers in Texas in the state system
are about what they are in the federal system. You said thirteen trials
per court federal system; we're down to fifteen in the state system.
We're down much more in civil cases than in criminal cases. I think
that indicates that the important thing that's going on is that the
results in civil cases have been unacceptably unpredictable and that
has not happened as much in the criminal system. Guilt and innocence
sentences are still within the same ranges they pretty much always
were.
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Judge PatrickHigginbotham:
Getting on that point, does that mean then that juries on the civil
side are not the culprit since all these criminal cases have been tried
by juries or... ?
Justice Nathan Hecht:
Well, I think it means that in civil cases, at least, whether it's the
perception or the reality, the inability to predict the result within
tolerable standards has moved people to consider arbitration and
mediation and other places where risks can be predicted more
accurately.
Judge Patrick Higginbotham:
How does a lawyer predict what a jury's going to do with a case
when he's only tried five in his career?
Justice Nathan Hecht:
Well, it's impossible. This spirals in on itself because the fewer
lawyers that have tried jury cases or any kind of case, the fewer who
are going to try them in the future. So, it's a problem that becomes a
vortex.
Judge PatrickHigginbotham:
So, you think, Nathan, it is the lack of certainty.
Justice Nathan Hecht:
I think its uncertainty among a huge number of repeat litigants
like the securities industry or people who say, "Okay, we're going to
take our litigation business to the private sector. We can predict more
carefully what arbitrators will do."
Judge PatrickHigginbotham:
Predictability. Now do you attribute that to juries or to judges, or
to both?
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Justice Nathan Hecht:
I think it is mostly juries, but I think it's perceived as being both. I
mentioned a study this morning about whether juries or judges are
more likely to find liability in a tort case, or more likely to award
damages. The answer seems to be that judges are more likely to find
liability, less likely to award bigger damages.
Judge PatrickHigginbotham:
Well, that's interesting. The data is exactly the opposite of that
under the Federal Tort Claims Act, where judges do try the cases with
no jury and what you find is very high awards being entered by judges,
greater than juries. One of the explanations put forward is that you
have twelve lay people there and the evidence, you have a
quadriplegic, you've got someone seriously injured on a governmentowned or managed lake and the government is sued for turning the
water loose from the dam, for example. It is tried to a judge and the
judge listens to this evidence that the economist spins about his
income, it's going to be over twenty years or thirty years life
expectancy and spends it out in some of the cases, we want $9 million
in damages and the judge says that's rational, that makes sense. These
numbers add up and so he awards $9 million. The expert says to that
the jury and the jury says, "How much?" So, the data shows that
judges, in fact, award more.
Let me give you one of the datum and get some other question on
that. As the numbers of trials have come down, there is a flip of the
relationship between the relative numbers of bench trials versus jury
trials. Before this period of time, two-thirds of the cases tried were
bench trials, one-third were jury. It's the opposite now. Two-thirds of
those that actually tried are to juries and only one-third of them are
bench trials. Now, you can let that kind of hang out there. Bill, what
do you think about that? What is the cause? It's still on the question
of "cause." What's the phenomena here?
William Dorsaneo:
About the bench trial switch?
Judge Patrick Higginbotham:
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William Dorsaneo:
Just in general?
Judge PatrickHigginbotham:
No, I put that out there to kind of complicate the picture, but I
really want to go around the panel to get everybody's notion about
what's going on here.
William Dorsaneo:
Frankly, with respect to the federal system, when I started
practice a long time ago, we used to go to the federal court because we
thought the judges were maybe better in some sense. They had more
helpers.
Judge PatrickHigginbotham:
Some are. (With a smile).
William Dorsaneo:
And I think that certainly the attitude has changed where I am.
Judge PatrickHigginbotham:
Well, are you suggesting this phenomena is limited to federal
courts? The data is suggesting the opposite.
William Dorsaneo:
I think it's probably a larger federal phenomenon. I also have
some disbelief on Nathan's statistics. I'm not sure the same sort of
thing is going on everywhere. I also wonder if the number of trial days
is also gone down.
I'm not surprised that the federal courts have less to do because
of the nature of the federal pretrial practice and the non-user friendly
quality of that system. I teach federal civil procedure, but I have not
been to federal court very much in many years, at least not willingly.
Certainly, my attitude has changed dramatically about that.
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Judge Patrick Higginbotham:
So, what is the cause? What are you saying?
William Dorsaneo:
Not just attitude. There's lack of predictability. Maybe too much
power and unpredictable.
Judge Patrick Higginbotham:
Is there is such a thing?
William Dorsaneo:
Well, of course, no one is more powerful than a federal judge in a
limited jurisdictional sphere.
Judge PatrickHigginbotham:
Well, their congressman didn't think that.
William Dorsaneo:
And I would really wonder whether the same sort of phenomena
is happening in the state system or if it is happening for the same
reasons.
Judge Patrick Higginbotham:
Well, let us assume that Nathan's data is correct and Dr.
Hensler's data is correct and this is a phenomena that is not confined
to federal courts. Then what is happening?
William Dorsaneo:
Well, we have certain devices. We have a lot more dispositions in
the state system on other basis other than a full-scale trial than we
used to. We have a lot of cases where we get dispositive or nearly
dispositive rulings early on and maybe that would facilitate the
elimination of the case from the field, either because the summary
judgment was granted or because the rulings indicate that the trial
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wouldn't be necessary.
Judge PatrickHigginbotham:
So, you say the possibility of summary judgment.
William Dorsaneo:
Procedural changes that make the trial less important as a
method for disposition of the controversy.
Judge PatrickHigginbotham:
You figure the difference between the state and the federal court
on that?
William Dorsaneo:
Not here now.
Judge Patrick Higginbotham:
Why wouldn't that really make it a more determinant and a more
certain system than the trial itself if this is being caused by the
uncertainties of trial and they have never been disposed of without
trial? Yet it's going on. How do you explain that?
William Dorsaneo:
Well, because they can be. They can be disposed of without trial
and that would be a way to deal with them. Now, we also have
alternative dispute resolution and maybe that has picked up some of
the freight, but I really doubt that.
Judge PatrickHigginbotham:
Well, let me ask you a question. Is the growth of ADR the cause
of it or is it the beneficiary of it? Why are people leaving the system to
go to ADR? Let somebody else jump in here.
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Justice Scott Brister:
Well, I agree with Judge Hecht. Sometimes you hear people say,
"Well it's the cost and the delays of court system that leads people to
ADR" Certainly there are some cases where that's true. You are
never going to get a small case to trial and so you have to settle it, but
I think plenty of people I've talked to seem to think that arbitration is
not any faster. In a lot of cases that I, as a trial judge, referred to
arbitration it seemed like it would take a year to pick the arbitrators.
We hadn't even figured out who's going to be the judge yet. I'd say,
"Look, I can have this tried before you all even find out who's going
to do this this week." And I remember at one of the Fifth Circuit
conferences, Steve Susman's favorite quote, "If you hire three
arbitrators and tell them, we'll pay you $350 an hour to arbitrate this
case, you can bet it is going take a long time to do that arbitration."
Judge PatrickHigginbotham:
Well, Steve is getting $700 an hour.
Justice Scott Brister:
It can't be just costs or delays. Arbitrators make mistakes just like
everybody else and there is no appeal; people are shocked by this.
They want to come back into court and say, "Undo this."
Judge PatrickHigginbotham:
Well, now you're telling us that arbitration may be not so
desirable, but the fact is they are fleeing to arbitration.
Justice Scott Brister:
Well, some of them are, the ones who would like to go before the
arbitrator because it's too expensive for the other side and they might
believe they'd have a better shot at arbitration panels than they would
trying cases to average people. In the arbitration cases that I know of,
some of my friends and their clients are dragged unwillingly to
arbitration, not because they want to go. The attitude of the state and
federal system is that arbitration is a great thing. That's a new
attitude. That wasn't the attitude that existed when I went to law
school. It was regarded as kind of an invasion of the right to a public
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trial.
Judge PatrickHigginbotham:

But you disagree with Justice Kennedy's observation in Circuit
about the values of arbitration and summary disposition? What
about the cost?
City3

Vikram Amar:

Well, let me say one or two things about the cause and then a
word about the consequences. I think one of the reasons why jury
trials are more unpredictable and may be encouraging people to vote
with their feet is because of the way we have structured the process of
jury selection. I mean, we heard this morning from a jury consultanteverybody needs a jury consultant. We have made this thing a game.
Juries don't really look like America because we make such a science
of using peremptory challenges. We don't pay jurors. We don't
provide childcare. We encourage people to shirk.
Judge PatrickHigginbotham:

On the federal side, you only get six now.
Vikram Amar:

Six dollars. In California, we just raised it to $15 from $6. But if
you really want juries to look and act like America, then you wouldn't
be structuring them this way. As Justice Brister pointed out earlier, we
do not focus as a society on why we have juries in the first place. So,
then the kind of popular conception of juries doing silly, crazy things,
encourages people not to want to be on them. I think these are kinds
of mutually-reinforcing downward spiral trends.
Judge PatrickHigginbotham:

Well, let me ask you one finite point just a little bit. Are you
saying that people believe that the juries are, in fact, unpredictable, or
is it simply that the lawyers, trying to cover their rear, are telling their
clients that it is better not to try the case to a jury?
3.

Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001).

378

SOUTH TEXAS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47:367

Vikram Amar:
The later, because the lawyers have not tried cases.
Judge PatrickHigginbotham:
Well, the juries are unfair. Where is this coming from? What is
the objective empirical data that they are "unpredictable"?
Vikram Amar:
Well, I guess you are right. I mean, the fewer trials that any
lawyer does, the less the lawyer is more expert in the system than a
layperson who is getting his information from these headlines and
these kind of popular conceptions. I think that lawyers may overstate
the unpredictability of jurors because of these conceptions. More
generally, I don't know any of my friends who would ever be on a jury
unless they absolutely couldn't get out of it. So, both things are
operating at once. There is a reality and then there's a perception of
reality; they're both along parallel tracks.
And when it comes to the consequences, as a law professor I see
it. Especially in some of the traditional common law areas like
contracts and torts and property, if you look at the modern case books
in some of these areas, they are devoid of state supreme court
opinions in the last decade or two. There's really not that much
contract law being generated because all major commercial disputes
are being resolved by private arbitration that never sees the light of
day. And I wonder, in the long run, if we are starving our appellate
courts. Obviously, there are summary judgment cases and other things
that get to the appellate courts, but if we're starving the appellate
courts of a lot of cases that used to go to trial, is that going to shape
substantive areas of law in unpredictable ways going forward?
Judge PatrickHigginbotham:
So, in a nutshell, then what, in your view, is the cause of this
decline in trials?
Vikram Amar:
I don't know that there is a single cause. I mean, part of it's a lack
of education and a lack of awareness, as Justice Brister told us. We
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don't talk about this stuff enough. But I do think we've designed the
rules too much for picking juries, too much for the benefit of judges
and lawyers. I think that we don't take into account why we have a
jury when we think about things like preemptive challenge, or juror
pay, or child care, or whether jurors should take notes or ask
questions of the witnesses and the like. You know, judges have a
predicable incentive to want to aggrandize their own power. They're
just people as well.
Judge Patrick Higginbotham:
Well, let me ask a question about this perception of lack of
reliability or predictability with juries. Why then do we put a man on
trial for his life with a jury if we won't trust them with the trial's civil
damage cases? Why are juries suddenly more predictable when you're
trying criminal cases?
Vikram Amar:
I don't know that they are more predictable in criminal cases.
You heard the district attorney in Los Angeles a few weeks ago call
the jury that acquitted Robert Blake a bunch of morons. You have got
a national outcry when 0. J. Simpson got acquitted.
Judge PatrickHigginbotham:
Who was the moron?
Vikram Amar:
Well, like I say, I am not sure whether it was the district attorney
or the jury that was really at fault there.
Judge PatrickHigginbotham:
That was not the smartest statement a public district attorney
might make.
Vikram Amar:
I totally agree with that.
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Judge PatrickHigginbotham:
He may have thought that.
Vikram Amar:
Let me give you an example, again, it's from the criminal context,
since you brought it up. In the Scott Peterson case, it took six months
and 3,000 jury questionnaires to pick a jury that convicted him in a
couple of hours. That tells me something is wrong with the way the
system is put together.
Judge PatrickHigginbotham:
Right. Okay. Good.
Justice Nathan Hecht:
Let me add one other thing. Nobody just knows empirically
what's likely to happen in a jury trial. You had to go try people. Back
in the old days, people would try to settle cases and the plaintiff would
keep asking for a little more and the defendant keep offering a little
less. Finally, somebody would get peeved and they'd go try five or
eight or ten or twelve cases and then you would see what the verdicts
were coming in at. Then it would recalibrate and everybody would
start back finding out where the middle was until it got off. I don't
think that happens much any more.
Judge PatrickHigginbotham:
One of the concerns out there is the indeterminacy that comes
from the absence of settlements and the shadow of trial that
distinguish from settlements that are worked and conducted in
mediation. Michael, you are wearing an appellate hat an awful lot of
times, but you're no stranger to this.
Mike Hatchell:
I need to be very careful in what I say because I am probably not
the best person to comment on this. Since August of 1965, I have done
nothing but work in the appellate courts and I haven't observed the
progress of trials, but I have some feelings about it that are largely
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anecdotal. I would phrase it differently from what Justice Hecht says.
I think things are too predictable. It is an unfortunate by-product. I
can tell you exactly how a case is going to come out before it goes to a
jury in many parts of this state. I don't want to go into the reasons why
I can do that. I can also pretty much tell you how a case is going to
come out on appeal. What I think is happening, at least I see this
anecdotally, is that those two predictabilities are canceling one
another out so that parties are much more willing to settle, short of a
trial. The other component is that discovery is now so expensive.
Judge Patrick Higginbotham:
Well, Michael, let me take you up on that point. Are the parties
willing to settle because they don't want any part of the court?
Justice Nathan Hecht:
Yeah. Well, I think that is probably a backwash from the same
factors that I'm talking about and that would be, frankly, that cases
are so expensive to try that the prospect of litigation makes sense
particularly for large corporations to settle. The other factor is that,
because of the predictability of the appellate outcome, parties who are
representing plaintiffs are more willing to downsize their expectations
and are downsizing their clients' expectations. Frankly, what I find is
cases either being resolved after they have been filed or resolved in
the negotiating stage for what is largely defense costs, and that is a lot
of money today.
Judge Patrick Higginbotham:
Is it important that the case be settled on a trial docket, as
distinguished from being settled in a mediation process? Is there a
difference? Let me frame the question a little finer. The suggestion is
that what is going on is not a competition between trials in the court
system insomuch as trials outside the court system, it is because there
aren't trials. It is rarely is the competition between pretrial systems.
Do I want to proceed in the federal court, for example, or the state
court in a pretrial process or do I want to go through a pretrial process
outside the court towards a settlement? As one general counsel told
me, "That's a no brainier." He had 600 lawyers answering to him in a
national insurance company and was very heavily involved in
mediation. Cost was the simple reason. We know pretty much what
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the general dimensions of a dispute are, but it costs a lot of money to
take it from where we know the general dimensions of a dispute and
bring in outside counsel and then go to discovery, with the documents
and all the other legal activity and then have the counsel come back
and say: "This case needs to be settled. The juries are unpredictable.
The courts are unpredictable and this case needs to be settled." If I'm
going to be told that, I'd rather go ahead and pay the check now and I
don't have all that cost. The observation is: Defense people don't like
that. Plaintiffs' lawyers do like that. Now, Do you have any further
thoughts about causation?
Justice Nathan Hecht:
Well, I would say, of course you can't intelligently settle a case if
you don't know what it's about. So, you are gonna have to engage in
some exchange of information to get there. But one of the
disadvantages of the litigation system is that there just does not seem
to be any end to that. Particularly, it makes it possible for lawyers who
just don't want to get to judgment day to push that off with lots of
discovery, it makes it possible for lawyers to harass people to where
they just say, "Look, the games not worth the gamble."
Judge PatrickHigginbotham:
Let us talk about this lack of predictability for a moment. The
assumption has been, as I understand your comments, that
unpredictability of the system is a cause and the unpredictability
attributed to the uncertainties-either certainty or absolute certainty
of a judge or a jury-or the uncertainty of it either way. It focuses on
those decision-makers themselves.
Let me raise another question with you. To what extent is this
uncertainty generated by the indeterminacy of the standards for
liability that we put to a jury? Take this example and in most typical
products' liability case tried across this country, what happens is when
the trial judge turns to the jury and says: "Ladies and gentlemen of the
jury, the first question you must answer is whether, did the plaintiff
prove that the evidence the product was defective? Please answer this
question yes or no. In answering the question of whether or not this
product was defective, I instruct you that a product is defective if its
danger outweighs its general utility. Now, if you have answered the
first question yes, then answer the next question. Was the defect that
you have found in answering question number one a producing cause
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of injury? If the answer is yes, answer the next question. What sum is
reasonable to compensate the plaintiff for the injury you found in this
case?"
Those are the questions that are put in a Rule 49 submission in a
products liability case. Now, when you turn to six persons and ask
them the question of weighing the social utility against cost, is the
uncertainty of the outcome inherent in the jury structure of laypersons
deciding these questions, or does it adhere in the standards under
which judges ask those laypersons to resolve the question? What is
your thought about it? What does the indeterminacy of our standards
have to do with it?
William Dorsaneo:
Well, it seems clear to me that the prevailing liability theory, let's
say from Judge Calvert's period,4 is really a negligence liability
standard that involves a complete bar of defense contributory
negligence. Quite frankly, as a tort teacher knows, the negligence
liability theories are a particularly good vehicle for juries to resolve
car wrecks and even premises liability cases. Juries can operate within
the general standard and decide the particular case as well, or
probably better, than a judge. Once we get into the late 1960s, and I
guess really into the 1970s, with strict product liability as an
accompanying theory in other complex theories, I am quite sure that
juries had a harder time with those cases. I'm also sure that the
lawyers, who hadn't tried very many of any kind of cases, had a hard
time presenting them to the juries. We used to think you could do a
federal securities case without a great deal of difficulty. If you were a
good lawyer, you could present the case, no matter what the liability
theory. But you are talking about experienced trial lawyers who have
spent a lot of time trying cases in general. So, there's no doubt that
these changes in the substance of law must have a significant impact
on whether you want to go to the courthouse to begin with.
Judge Patrick Higginbotham:
Consider punitive damages. Till recently, this was a real wildcard
in the game. For example, I was mediating the breast implant cases.
The problem, we didn't have a history of litigation. These are trial
4. Robert W. Calvert served in the Supreme Court of Texas from 1950 to 1972 and
was Chief Justice from 1961 to 1972.
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lawyers. Question, how do you value these cases? They said,
"Well,.
" I said, "Why don't we try five cases?" So, they did and
the lawyers predicted in one case that was going to go to trial that the
jury would range the verdict if liability is found will be $750,000 to a
million, two or three. Liability was found. They were absolutely right.
Liability hit right in the middle of that predicted zone of return. The
difficulty was that the jury came back with $25 million in punitive
damages because the only thing they asked the jury was: "What sum if
now, would be reasonable to deter, da, da, da." And you had this
something bordering on a standard list of discretion for shifting
liability, etcetera. Now, the court is going to rein that in, but what do
you say? Is it the jury or the way we are managing the system that is
inherently unstable? Is it the institution, or is it the question we put?
If you ask a stupid question or an open-ended question, why do you
blame the people who give the answer? What standard do you hold
them to? That's one of the questions. You have any comment about
this part of the indeterminacy business?
Vikram Amar:

I guess I would say two things: One, again, if we are not
constituting juries the right way, then it is tough to ask the question
you asked. In other words, the real question is: If we had juries that
were picked by a more sensible process, would they be more
responsible kind of repositories of the trust that we're giving them. I
don't know enough about torts to know whether modern product
defect law is really that much more open-ended than traditional
negligence law. I mean, maybe it is a harder thing for juries to get
their hands around, but even if it is, the question I would come back
with is: Assuming we had a better way of gathering twelve kinds of
common sense minds, would we rather have one judge decide how to
conduct that kind of societal weighing between cost and benefits, or
would we rather have the input of twelve people? And even if it is a
hard question, it's not clear to me that we want to relegate it to just a
few judges.
Judge Patrick Higginbotham:

Well, your comment goes to a judgment that you don't like what
is happening and what I'm trying to get at is why is it happening
without making a value judgment about whether one system is good
or not. The fact that we can't escape is that a lot of people think that
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it's better. Now, playing a little more with causation. One of the
suggestions made by Dorsaneo had to do with the pretrial
determinations causing earlier disposition in both federal and state
systems. When I first looked at this data, I thought we had the trilogy
of summary judgment cases on the U.S. Supreme Court on the federal
side, which traditionally are viewed as encouraging trial court to grant
a summary judgment. I thought, well, looking at that trilogy, we
should be seeing an upsurge in the numbers of cases that are
determined on the ground of summary judgment. That would explain
some of the declines in trials. But when I looked at the data, it was
flat. Professor Burbank' up at Penn has done much more refined
empirical work and he finds that there is a little increase, but it's just a
blip. It still does not account for the decline in jury trials. So, at least
in the federal forum, the procedural mechanism does not necessarily
explain this phenomena.
Vikram Amar:
For example, it took my state of California maybe ten or fifteen
years to kind of follow some of the lessons of Celotex and the
summary judgment trilogy. I actually think that, in California,
summary judgment adjudication now is more common than it was a
decade or two decades ago. So, I think, as you mentioned earlier, each
system might have its own nuances to be taken into account.
Judge PatrickHigginbotham:
I thought that on the federal side. The data just, unfortunately, is
not quite as compelling as that.
Justice Nathan Hecht.We changed our rule what five years ago, six years ago to
essentially...
Judge Patrick Higginbotham:
More closely track the federal side.

5.
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SO UTH TEXAS LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 47:367

Vikram Amar:

Yes. And summary judgments are down.
William Dorsaneo:

But there may be more summary judgment hearings. Maybe that
has to do with the expense.
It seems to be that this is kind of a pogo thing. Seeing the enemy,
it's us. It has a lot of different attributes that would have to be the key
thing, expense and delay. I think when I first started practicing law in
1970, I think my hourly rate was $25 an hour and I don't know what
that is in 2005 dollars, but I know it was low in comparison.
It has got to be the expense, got to be the major factor. To the
extent that people can get out of the system and think that gives them
a substantive or a procedural advantage, of course, they try to do that.
And that has been facilitated by decisions. Arbitration might be even
more expensive, but they want to go there anyway.
Judge Patrick Higginbotham:

Let me get you to comment on another thing.
William Dorsaneo:

To answer another question myself, expense is probably the key
thing.
Judge PatrickHigginbotham:

Comment on this phenomena. One of the suggestions here is that
we are involved with what is a large attitude change about the law
itself. There's a large ideological push toward different forms of
resolution that's clearly hostile to a yes/no answer. I sometimes
teasingly tell people, "everybody gets a trophy," this ideological
approach to litigation is a solution to our problem that stems from
soccer moms. The point being that, unquestionably, there is a large
ideological push behind some of this, but having said that, if you look
at some other data, not only are we seeing a movement away from
courts in general, but an enormous upsurge on the administrative side.
I tell my students in federal courts that we look at Article III and we
think this is exclusivity-sort of an exclusive franchise from federal
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side. The reality is that most of these federal disputes are decided by
federal judges, but not federal judges as you think of them. They are
administrative law judges. Let me give you a couple of pieces of data
here.
The Department of Health and Human Services for the year 2000
employed more than 800 administrative law judges-that's the
approximate number of federal district judges-and they adjudicate
more than 320,000 cases each year, more civil cases than all federal
districts combined. Similarly Social Security disposes of 280,000 cases
annually. So that is just two agencies resolving 600,000 cases annually.
Now, only about 10,000 of those end up flowing into the federal
courts. You can multiply that out. Most of the administrative work
was originally in courts themselves. We know that historically and it
has been moved out of courts into the administrative agency. As you
move to a court system where there is little anticipation of trials, you
have a managerial judge looking and walking and talking very much
(1) like the administrative side and (2) very much like the European
civil law system. This is increasingly true on the state side as well. One
can play with this and say that this is part of a larger phenomena
where we are seeing transnational influences because the market will
not stop at political boundaries, but remember that arbitration has its
birth and genesis in transnational arbitration itself.
With that kind of a predicate, what is your reaction to the
observation that the United States district courts today are really
functioning as an administrative agency? Understand that over half of
the cases that go to the United States Court of Appeals from the
district court in every circuit in the country now are filed by prisoners.
They come through a system to a magistrate law system with law
clerks, they go up to the district clerk, the law clerk, they come to the
Fifth Circuit in New Orleans. We have sixty lawyers on the New
Orleans' staff counsel to process these. So, what I'm saying is that
there's a huge volume of cases and in almost none of these cases will
there or could there be a trial. They are processed administratively.
So, you have a system that is increasingly fueled with cases that are
never going to trial. What is your comment, Professor Amar, about
the observation that we are now moving toward an administrative
system, like it or not?
Vikram Amar:
I think it poses a number of challenges. I think you are right that
there are broader, even international trends going on. I guess I would
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say two things. One of the things I'm going to talk about this
afternoon in my presentation are the sentencing guideline casesBlakely,6 Booker and Fanfan--wherethe court seems to reject a kind
of bureaucratic administrative convenience and ease in the name of
enforcing some hard vision of the Sixth Amendment. Now, there may
be some differences between the Sixth and Seventh Amendments, but
if the vision of the jury that Justice Scalia sketches out in Blakely is to
be meaningful, then maybe there is going to have to be some checks
drawn on this increasing bureaucratism. Going back to what Justice
Brister said earlier, maybe the demographics and the economics of it
are just moving in an irresistible way towards this different kind of
model, a more European model. Pretrial makes the most sense, given
our initial objectives, and to try to retain it in those areas and
concentrate on that.
Judge PatrickHigginbotham:

Well, I think former Chief Justice Phillips, in his own subtle way,
would like us to wrap this up. I thank the members of the panel for a
fun and lively discussion.

6.
7.
8.

Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
United States v. Booker, 542 U.S. 738 (2005).
United States v. Fanfan, 125 S. Ct. 12 (2005).

